University of Montana

ScholarWorks at University of Montana
Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, &
Professional Papers

Graduate School

1967

Covenant not to compete: An analysis of its tax consequences
Richard Harley Boswell
The University of Montana

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Boswell, Richard Harley, "Covenant not to compete: An analysis of its tax consequences" (1967). Graduate
Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers. 8558.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/8558

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of
Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

THE COVENANT NOT TO COMPETE:
AN ANALYSIS OF ITS TAX CONSEQUENCES
By
Richard Harley Boswell
B. S. Bradley UniTersity, 1957
Presented in partial fulfillment of
The requirements for the degree of
Master of Science
UNIVERSITY OF MONTANA
1967
Approved hy:

Chairman, B o a r d o f E x a m i n e e s

Dean, Graduate School

JUL G

1967

Date

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

UMI Number: EP39359

All rights reserved
IN FO R M A TIO N T O ALL U SER S
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.

UMT
Dissaitaîlon FViWisteng

UMI E P 39359
Published by ProQuest LLC (2013). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code

uest*
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106 - 1346

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
One of the first harriers to the student who emharhs
upon the thesis adventure is the selection of a suitable
topic*

In this particular study, four topics were consid

ered and discarded before a feasible one was chosen*

It

was necessary to have the committee examine two complete
thesis drafts before the third, and final, form could be
acceptable*

For their kind patience and understanding

through a n inordinate degree of tacking, especially grate
ful regards are tendered to the chairman and members of his
committee*
A most sincere expression of thanks is offered to
Mr* Sebastian Smith of the Missoula office of the Internal
Revenue Service*

His willingness to acquaint an unknown

graduate student with much of the nomenclature in the sub
ject area, even while in the midst of a substantial work
load, was noteworthy*
In the specific realm of the thesis, Mr. George S,
Hanson, general counsel of the National Association of
Insurance Agents,

quite helpful.

Within a week after

receiving a letter of inquiry about relevant articles in
the American Agency Bulletin. Mr* Hanson remitted reprmts
of thirteen highly germane items which spanned the preced11

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

ing five years.

For persons who might he interested in this

bundle of material, a letter to Mr. Hanson at his offices
located 96 Fulton Street, New York, New York 10033, will suf
fice.
To this writer's family must go a deep tribute for
the disruptions of nearly a year— having to keep the tele
vision set volume low, putting up with occasional outbuists
from a struggling researcher, giving up nights out and week
ends of family fun so that "Dad" could work on his thesis.
The understanding attitude of his family through this strug
gle will be long remembered hy the writer.
Finally, to a true educator who believed in him and
encouraged him to the end. Professor Fred A. Henningsen, the
committee chairman, must go deep-felt gratitude.

Professor

Henningsen*s example shall serve as a guideline for the writer
in his own on-going experiences as an educator.

If at any

time the writer might feel inclined to be abusive of the pow
er given him over students, he shall look back to the kind
respect afforded him by his thesis chairman and try to fol
low that pattern of dignity toward fellow man with the under
standing mien of one of genuine knowledge.

iii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

TABLE OF CCKTENTS
CHAPTER
I,

page

I NTRODUCTION A N D S T A T E M E N T OF THESIS
D e f i n itions and Rest r i c t i o n s

.

.

............
.

.

.

.

1

N a t u r e of tHe Covenant

3

N e c e s s i t y of the Covenant

5

S t a t ement of Thesis

7

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

A p p r o a c h for R e s o l u t i o n of Thesis
II.

.

1

. . . . . .

V A L I D I T Y A N D ENFOR C E A B I L I T Y OF COVENANT
H i s t o r y and Rules of V a l i d i t y
Covenant Enfor c e a h i l i t y

. . . .

8
10

. . . . . . . . 1 0

. . . . . . . . . . . 1 3

Is a Covenant N e c e s s a r y in a n Otherwise
Desirahle Itirchase?

# . . , . . . . . . . . 1 8

Eiunaary and Conclusions A h o u t P r o t e c t i o n . . .
III.

TAX CONSEQUENCES OVERVIEW:
TREATMENT

. . . . .

20

INCOME TAX

...................

. . . .

22

Without Covenant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2
T r e a t m e n t of Covenant
IV.

..........

. . . . . . . 2 6

C O V E N A N T TAX DES I G N A T I O N A1ÏD ALLOCA T I O N
ELEMENTS OF U N C E R T A I N T Y ......................... 31
Co n t r adictions in the Courts

. . . . . . . . . 3 1

Miscellaneous Cove n a n t T a x Pitfalls

. . . . . 4l

iv

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CIIAPTEH

PAGE
No On© Factor a Sole Determinant . . . . . .

V.

45

SUMMAHY AND C O N C L U S I O N S .......................... 4?
Protection Certainty Greater Du© To
Covenant

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7

Tax Designation Certainty Diminished . . . .
Conclusions

49
.50

Final Chservations . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4
E I B L I O G S A P Î Ï Y ..........................

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

57

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION A N D STATEMENT OF THESIS
Definitions and Restrictions
To e s t a b l i s h the honndaries for this study,

the two

m a j o r p h rases in its title should be examined first*
n a n t n o t to compete,

A cove

in the framework herein used, has b e e n

d e fined b y the Internal R e v e n u e Service to be simply, "an
a g r e e m e n t whe r e b y the seller of a business states that he
will n o t compete w i t h the buyer for a limited time or w i t h i n
1
a n a g r e e d a r e a or a c o m b i n a t i o n of both*"
Commerce Clearing
H o u s e d e s cribes the covenant not to compete w i t h brevity,
"Agreements not to compete— W h e r e the vendor of a business
covenants to ref r a i n for a specified period from competing
2
w i t h the vendee . • .
A l t h o u g h the p r e c e d i n g two definitions could serve to
identify a covenant, a mo re elaborate classification is neces-

^U* 8* T r e a s u r y Department, Internal R e v e n u e Service,
Tax G u i d e for Small Business » I9 6 7 , Pu b l i c a t i o n No* 33^ > P* 5^665 C C H 1965 STAND. FED. TAX. REP. Par. 4717*0971.
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sary*

Essentially, the covenant not to compete is an agree

ment to be included within, or to accompany, the contract for
the sale of a business in which the seller agrees to refrain
from certain or all of the activities of that business for a
specified period of time and/or within a designated geograph
ical area.

Whether it is a part of the general sales agree

ment or a separate item, the covenant constituks a contrac
tual obligation of the seller.

Its specific elements are:

(1) it is given by the seller of a business to the buyer for
the buyer’s protection;

(2) it is an agreement Iby which the

seller is restrained from competing, partially or wholly,
with the buyer; and (3) it may state a time period, a geograph
ical area, or both, within which the defined competition is
prohibited.
The matter of Ernest E. Suggs and &Iar.1orie S. Suggs v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue^ furnishes a n example of a
covenant not to compete w h i c h accompanied the sale of a n in
surance agency:
The seller further agrees that they will not for a
period of five years from the date of this contract,
directly or indirectly, engage in business as a gen
eral insurance agent within a radius of 100 miles of
Phoenix, Arizona, nor aid, nor assist anyone else in
said business in said territory, except that it is
agreed that Seller may retain their insurance agent’s
licenses, and that as to insurance sold to any new
accounts, such business shall be placed only through
the office of the Buyer, the Seller to be compensated
o n the basis of fifty per cent (50%) of the commission
payable on the entire premium, whether paid in advance

^E. E. S u g g s . 24 can Tax Ct. Mem. 1194 (196*5).
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or paid in monthly, quarterly, semi-annual, or annual
installments.
This study’s "Analysis Of Its (the covenant’s) Tax: Con
sequences" will he a restricted one.

Only federal income

taxes and consequences resulting therefrom will he considered,
although some parallels might he drawn for state income taxes
since these often se^i to follow federal rulings.

Further,

the analysis is focused on a consideration of the relative cer
tainty of the covenant’s tax consequences.

Specifically, it

is concerned with the designation of all or part of the sale
proceeds, from the vie^vpoint of hoth huyer and seller, and
how sure the parties can he of a given designation.

The ob

ject here is to observe what Impact the covenant has upon the
tax consequences, and h o w certain that impact is in effecting
one designation or another.
Finally, it should he noted that only sales of going
businesses will he examined.

Basically, a going "business is

one which is pursuing its normal course of commerce, is oper
ating as is customary to its kind of enterprise, and is not
in the process of bankruptcy or dissolution.^
Nature of the Covenant
A covenant not to compete is, in itself, a contract or
a promise in writing under seal.

The unqualified word, "cove-

^ o r a recent decision in the sale of an inoperative
business, interested persons are referred to the matter of
Savings Assurance Agency. Inc. v. C.I.R.. CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
/ 1 oA'J \

'
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nant,"
tract."

is sometimes used as a suTbstitute for the word "con
Therefore, if one were to look for information ahout

the covenant not to compete (also called a negative covenant,
agreement not to compete, restrictive agreement, or restric
tive covenant) in commercial law publications, he would find
it usually in the section dealing with contracts.

Interest

ingly enough, the covenant is found most often in a subsection
entitled "Illegal Contracts."

Contracts, or segments thereof,

which provide for the restraint of trade or the limitation of
competition are ordinarily deemed inimical to the public in
terest and, therefore, illegal and unenforceable.

Although

the covenant not to compete has as its basic purpose the re
straint of competition, it is one of the exceptions to the
rule of illegal contracts and is valid w h e n it is reserved
to the sale of a going business.

A number of other qualifi

cations are necessary to establish the covenant’s legality
and enforceability, but these will be illustrated in detail
in Chapter II.
The Uniform Commercial Code, adopted or pending adop
tion in nearly every jurisdiction in the United States at
this writing, deals w i t h agreements not to compete in its
Section 2-302.

The Code applies the rule of "unconscionabil-

ity" to contracts for sale (closely allied to "illegality" and
•inimical to the public interest*), and also deems the covenant
to be in the nature of a n exception under unconscionable con
tracts.
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N e c e s s i t y of the Goveiiajnt
The purchaser of a functioning enterprise obtains not
only the physical assets of the firm, hut also w h a t is often
the m o s t v alua b l e asset,

its goodwill*

The latter has b e e n

v a r i o u s l y defined, but, for the purposes of this study,

it

m i g h t best be deemed the potential of a business to realize
earnings a bove a nonral re t u r n from the investment in its
tangible assets*

This intangible, goodwill,

is the essence

of the purcîiase of a going business*
Should the seller of a business retake, or attempt to
retake,

the physical assets of the business h e had sold, he

w o u l d be subject to pr o s e c u t i o n for burglary, robbery, or
larceny— the exact crime depen d e n t u p o n the method employed*
However,

the possibly most valuable asset,

the goodwill,

is

his for the retaking in the absence of a contractual agreement
p rohibiting such action.

If a n y goodwill does in fact exist,

it is the seller w h o built it through his business acumen,
his customer dealings, and his intimate knowledge of the enter
prise*

It is not u n r e a s o n a b l e to believe that he could easily

d e c i m a t e his old business by starting a n e w one in competition.
Su b s t a n t i a l in a n y case, d e p l e t i o n of a personal service busi
ness b y seller c o m p e t i t i o n could be ruinous to the buyer— re
c a p ture estimates r u n as h i g h as ninety-five per cent of the
bu s i n e s s sold in the case of insurance agencies, according to
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one authority,
From a practical viewpoint, physical assets— all other
things equal— could he resold without great loss in the event
of dissipation of the husinees from seller raids.

Regardless

of the volume of "business heing transacted in the enterprise
(short of accelerated wear and tear which would he inversely
related to loss of huslness), a typewriter remains much the
same item as does a desk, chair, filing cabinet, and so on.
However,

goodwill establishment is a function of time;

its existence and solidity vary directly w i t h the passage of
time.

For the buyer, goodwill may not imve a form and amount

capable of early resale.

He must have time to build his own

goodwill in the business, and he must be free from untoward
competition in order to do so satisfactorily.

Therefore, this

intangible, goodwill, is an item which could be most severely
damaged by seller raids and open animosity.

Thus, the cove

nant not to compete is a necessity in agreements for the pur
chase and sale of going businesses.

Subject to its stated

limits of time and area, a covenant legally removes the u n 
certainty of seller competition with the buyer and gives the
buyer sufficient opportunity to establish his own goodwill.
In addition, by his execution of the covenant, the seller

^Charles VV, Tye, "Legal Problems of Insurance Agents—
Expirations," Readings in Property and Casualty Insurance.
H, Wayne Snider (eii.) (Homewood, 1 1 1 . : Richard D* Irwin, Inc.,
1959), p. ZZi*.
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p r o v i d e s tangible evidence of his good faith, and intention to
r e f r a i n from such abnormal competition.
B y its Inherent powers,
well
er,

the covenant not to compete m a y

enable a proper, arm's length sale of goodwill.
therefore,

The buy

is w i l l i n g to p a y a price, and the seller can

receive a sum, b o t h of whfch exceed the value of the business*
tangible assets.
Statement of Thesis
U p to this point,

there would seem to be no legitimate

c r i t i c i s m of the covenant, no valid reason to omit this item
f r o m a p r op e r l y —drafted contract of sale.

However, acco mpany

ing the Introduction of the covenant not to compete there ap
pears to be a h e i g htened degree of u n c e r t a i n t y in the federal
income tax d é s i g n â t ! on(s) of the sale proceeds.
c a n be stated as follows:

The problem

Does the covenant not to compete

a c h i e v e greater c e r t a i n t y of eliminating future competition
from the seller at the cost of diminishing certainty in the
federal

income tax designation(s) of the purchase monies?
This pro b l e m has two broad categories,

w h i c h is:

the first of

just h o w c e r t a i n is the protec t i o n afforded buyer

from a covenant not to compete?

V*hen a r e the terras of a

c o v enant n o t to compete too restrictive of trade and compe
t i t i o n to be valid?

If the time and a r e a are too great, will

the covenant be declared w h o l l y unenforceable,

or will the
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court amend Its terms to Toe enforceable?

What reliefs can

the Touyer seek if seller violates his agreements?

Essen

tially, therefore, the first part of the proTolem is to deter
mine if a covenant not to compete actually does accomplish
what it purports to do— to eliminate future competition from
the seller for a specified period of time and within a desig
nated geographical area.
The second portion of the prolilem is similarly complex.
It requires that one determine how uncertain the tax designation(s) of the purchase monies would "be in the alasence of a
covenant, and then to ascertain what difference (if any) is
traceal)le to the inclusion of the covenant.

Is this truly a

matter of tmcertainty, or is it simply hard to understand—
a matter for expertise?

In maleing a tax designation and an

allocation of proceeds to the agreement not to coiapete, what
criteria are applied?
Approach for Resolution of Thesis
Of course, the proTalem and its implicit questions are
of a legal nature.
resolution,

Therefore, to implement the process of

information must tie sought in legal, or law-

oriented, putjlications.

Business la%r texts and germane govern

ment publications, as well as periodicals, can serve well as
routing indicators in the matter.

However,

to make any truly

conclusive kind of analysis, one must look to the ultimate
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designators of contract validity and tax status of proceeds
and payments— the courts of record.
This study shall utilize the pertinent publications to
obtain general background material and citations of cases
relevant to the problem.

It shall provide its summary and

conclusions through a careful probe of the recorded cases,
the evidences of ultimate designations.
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CHAPTER II
VALIDITY AND ENFORCEABILITY OF COVENANT
History and Rules of Validity
Agreements not to compete were held to he void in such
early cases as Cyrus Alger v. George C. Thacher^ dated March,
1837.

Covenants w h i c h impaired competition were invalidated

hy the courts on the grounds that they:
lic to monopoly;
the covenantor;

(1) exposed the pub

(2) deprived the public of the services of
(3) reduced desirable competition; and (4)

impaired the covenantor’s means to earn a livelihood.

Basic

ally, the covenant was viewed as a measure to restrain trade
and, therefore,

inimical to the best interests of the public.

As time passed, some courts began to regard this nega
tive covenant to be valid if it accompanied the sale of a go
ing business and was limited in length of time and geograph
ical area.

In I9I8 , the case of J . R . Shute v. J. T. Shute^

resulted in the covenant being voided, but the court noted
that it would have been enforced had the period of time been
^Alger V. T ha c h e r . 19 Pick (Alass. ) 5I (1837).
2shute V. S h u t e . 1?6 N.C. 462, 97 S.E. 392 (I9I8 ).
10
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shorter.
G r adually> the concept of "reasonableness" in the re
straints was introduced, and the terms of a covenant would be
upheld so long as they were reasonable and not contrary to
public policy,

Becbzer Colletre of Business Administration and

Secretarial Science v, Sumner H, Gross^ in 1933 set forth this
approach a n d advised that

. what is reasonable depends

u p o n the facts of each case,"
A 1953 matter, Sîaola Ice Cream C o m m n y of North Caro
lina, Inc. V. Mao la Milk and Ice Cream Comuany.^ contains two
concepts which are germane to covenants to the present date.
In the first of these concepts can be found the essence of
rulings o n the reasonableness of covenants not to ctm p e t e :
A n agreement in partial restraint of trade contained
in a contract for the sale of a business is reasonable
if the restraint is such as to afford a fair protection
to the interests of the party to whose favor it is given
an d not so large as to interfere w i t h the interests of
the public.
However, contracts in partial restraint of
trade are contrary to public policy and void if nothing
shows them to be reasonable.
The c o u r t ’s findings further noted that a reasonable geograph
ic area for restriction would be limited to a well-defined
territory w h i c h had been served by the seller prior to the
sale.

Reasonableness in time was indicated as that sufficient

^Becker Coll erre of Business Administration v. G r o s s .
281 Mass. 355, 183 N.E. 765 119331“.
^Maola Ice Cream Co., Inc. v, Maola Milk & Ice Cream
C o . . 238 M.c. 3 1 7 , 77 S.E. 2d 910 { 1 9 5 3 H
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for a competent 'busineBsnian to e s t a b l i s h his legitimate inter
ests in the enterprise w h i c h he Imd purchased, a length of
time w h i c h would v a r y from one type of business to another,
but w o u l d not n o r m a l l y exceed three to five years.
In its second conceptual area,

this same case reiter

ates C h a p t e r I*s o b s e r v a t i o n regarding the buyer's relative
lack of p r o t e c t i o n for goodwill in the absence of a covenant
n o t to compete:
Generally, in the absence of a n agreement as to
the right to compete, vendor of premises a n d its
goodwill is n o t precluded from engaging in a similar
business in the vicinity, provided h e does not inter
fere w i t h p u r c h a s e r ’s enjoyment of the premises sold
a n d p r ovi d e d he does not engage in unfair competition.
In 1935»

the matter of J . L . Donahue v. Permacel Tape

Co r p o r a t i o n^ prescribed w h o was to decide the q u e s t i o n of
r e a s onableness and elaborated on the criteria w i t h a quote
f r o m »iil liston o n Contracts

(Section I6 3 6 , page 4380) :

It is everywhere a g r e e d tiiat in order to be valid
a p r omise imposing a restraint in trade or occupation
m u s t be reasonable.
The q u e s t i o n of reasonableness is
for the court, n o t the jury; and in considering what
is reasonable, regard for the q u e s t i o n must be paid to
(a) w h e t h e r the promise is wi d e r than is necessary for
the p r o t e c t i o n of the covenantee in some legitimate
interest, (b) the effect of the promise u p o n the cove
nantor, a n d (c) the effect u p o n the public . . . .

^ Donahue v. Permacol Tape C o r p . « (Ind. Sup. Ct.)
127 N.E. 2d 235 (195571

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

13
Further,

this case also serves to illustrate in the court’s

own words what can he the fate of covenants not to compete
w h i c h are not reasonable in time and/or area:
We cannot re^Tite the contract made hy the parties
and add to it matters which it does not contain and
then use the contract as rewritten as a hasis for
litigation, however justifiable equitable interference
under the circumstances might seem to he*
We conclude,
therefore, the covenant of contract upon which this
action is predicated is unenforceable in its entirety.
Thus, if the covenant’s terras are not reasonable in the
opinion of the court, the entire covenant may he declared void.
Such a n approach follows the general reluctance of the courts
to modify and construe contracts.

As a rule, cases which were

examined followed the practice of voiding the entire covenant
w h e n its restrictions were too broad, leaving the buyer with
out protection.

In several cases, by the time that the buyer

could bring his case to court, the time limit in the covenant
had already expired— for all practical purposes, the subse
quent invalidation by the court was superfluous, except to
prevent collection for damages, for purposes of injunction.
Some state courts did modify the terms of the covenant
not to compete to be reasonable.

Here the assumption was that

the parties must have envisioned some restraints when they en
tered into the original agreement for sale.

Thus, to avoid

restraint entirely would amount effectively to a material
amendment of the terras.

The matter of Georgette N. Thomas v.
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Toufilc PaTcer^ is a n example of s u c h a modification.
ally,

Ori g i n 

the agree m e n t in this case called for the defendant to

r e f r a i n from engaging d i r e c t l y or indirectly in the taker
b u s i n e s s for a p e r i o d of seven years w i t h i n a radius of seven
miles from the business w h i c h he had sold to the plaintiff.
Th e s e limitations w e r e held to he unreasonable, but the judge
amended them to four years a n d four miles rather than to void
the c o v enant entirely.

H e identified the covenant as a n e g a 

tive covenant since it w a s a n agree m e n t not to do something.
A r e there a n y rules of thumb regarding time and a r e a
restr i c t i o ns w h i c h can be relied u p o n by contracting parties,
p a r t i c u l a r l y buyers,

to be reasonable?

One text^ indicates

that three years tends to be tlie m a x i m u m safe limit o n time
w h i c h a covenant m a y embody.

This conclusion coincides well

w i t h this study as in no case examined was a three year time
limit considered u n r e a s o n a b l e ,
The trade a r e a w i t h i n w h i c h a f i r m ’s transactions have
b e e n conducted p r e v i o u s l y is read i l y establishable for b u s i n e s 
ses w i t h a fixed,

localized clientele.

This w o u l d constitute

a d e f e n s i b l e geographic restriction.

Where the firm has ca

tered to a transient cust o m e r group,

the q u e s t i o n of a r e a be-

^Thomaa v. f a k e r . 32? Mass, 339, 93 N.E. 2d 640 (1951).
^A, Aide C h a r l e s , C o l l e g e L a w For Business (Cincinnati;
S o u t h — W e s t e r n Publis h i n g Company, 1963), pi 661
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comes somewhat nelnilous.

No concrete rule of thumh appears

to he available regarding territorial restrictions where the
trade area is not readily definable, hut in the cases examined
wherein these kinds of restrictions were invalidated, the ex
cesses were somewliat overt.

Where the hîisiness had been of a

localized nature, the area restriction was extended to a major
portion of the state of domicile, or to the entire state; intrastate businesses attempted to restrict the United States from
competition*

In hoth time and area constraints, a very conserv

ative approach would he advisable if the buyer desires a high
degree of certainty in the legal enforceability of what is pre
scribed.
Covenant Enforceability
A covenant not to compete constitutes a contractual ob
ligation of the seller,
it by the buyer will

Tlie point of consideration given for

be developed in Chapter III, but essen

tially any part of the purciiase price may be allocated to the
covenant,

it ;aay be separately measured and drawn, or its con

sideration may be deemed indivisible from the entire sale pro
ceeds.

Violations of a valid covenant*s terms constitute a

bre a c h of contract,

A3 an initial enforcement of the contract, a competing
seller may be enjoined from such action in violation of his
legal promise.

The matter of Thomas v. ia~:or« cupra, note 6,
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this chapter, noted tliat ",

, , the coTenant may he enforced

hy injunction if the interests to he protected are consonant
w i t h public policy and if the restraint is limited reasonably
in time and space."
Where damages are positive and provable hy buyer, an
appropriate award m a y accrue to the injured party as in Whiting Mille C o m m n i e s v. William J, 0*Connell^ where it %vas
noted, "Contracts in restraint of trade • • • may he • , . en
forced in equity • • • •

Damages may be aivarded for interfer

ence w ithin a reasonable time and space if vendee is injured,"
What constitutes damages, as far as the sum is concerned,
is more readily ascertainable where the covenant is valued in
the contract as a separate item, or is handled wholly as a sep
arate contract.

In some cases the rule is that installment

payments for a covenant cease from the point of violation as
in Emmette L. Barran and Martha Bar ran, et al v. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue^ Seller is obliged to return the subse
quent payments received, and is entitled to no further payment.
Other cases, such as Fred Montes i and Carmel a Montes! v. Com
missioner of Internal R e v e n u e . p r o v i d e
agreed to in the contract of sale.

for fixed damages as

The court must determine

% hiting Milk Cos, v. O'Connell. 277 Mass. 570 (1931).
9e.L. Barran v. C . I . R . . (CA-5), CCH 6i*-2 U.S. Tax Cas,
Par. 9611, 334 F . (2d) W " U 9 6 4 ) .
^Q f . Montes! v. C.I . R . . (CA-6), CCH 65-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
Par. 9173, y*0 F. (2d>‘^ 7 (1 9 6 5 ).
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d a m a g e s i n m a n y cases o n tiie "basis of proof offered ty the
"buyer, a s in M e t r o p o l i t a n Ice Comnany v. James J. D u c a s .
Regardless of the m a n y avenues for enforcement of a
covenant,

legal remedies m a y he inadequate to the long-range

h a r m d o n e by violations*

The buyer often purchases a going

"iaisiness, paying for goodwill in a d d i t i o n to tangible assets,
in the c o n t e mplation of securing his economic future*

Only

time, w i t h o u t u n d u e competition a n d w i t h his good performance,
m a y s e e m n e c e s s a r y to solidify this plan*

W i t h seller compe

tition, the buyer m a y find himself i n a situation worse than
if h e h a d bought only the physical appurtenances of a firm
since h e paid for more.

Customer relationships m a y be so im

pa i r e d b y seller raids a n d o p e n animo s i t y that the better
clients s eek a third firm w i t h w h i c h to deal rather than "be
come involved in a n u n s a v o r y situation.

M a n y nationally—

p r o m i n e n t firms thrive in spite of p r o x y battles, suits for
patent infringements, and other competitive joustings so long
as the artiForlk: on the prod u c t label remains the same*

Local

enterprises, however, w i t h buyer and seller sharing many of
the same friends a n d acquaintances are especially susceptible
to c o m p e t i t i o n backlash.

Whether such rivalry is in v ü a t i o n

of a protective covenant or not,

its d i s r u p t i o n could be ex

t r e m e l y perilous to the firm, ment a l l y and fiscally ruinous

11 M e t r o n o 1itan Ice Go* v* D u c a s » ip6 N.E, 857 (1935).
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to a n e w entrepreneur trying to 1mlId hie own goodwill.
Is a Covenant Necessary in an
Otherwise Desirable Purciiase?
In view of the mitigating considerations regarding the
enforcement of a covenant not to compete, this question must
arise.

If the covenant is included due to a lack of trust be

tween the parties, the whole matter should he reviewed.

In

the absence of such evidence, and where there is a clear and
obvious meeting of the minds, some persons might deem a writ
ten agreement not to compete to be superfluous.
There are a number of sound reasons in support of the
inclusion of a covenant.

The first, and perhaps most basic,

cause is that the Uniform Commercial Code (Section 2-201),
as the old English Statute of Frauds, requires contracts for
sales of $500 or more to be in writing to be enforceable.
If the parties are dealing with a matter of competition for
w h i c h a value of this amount or more can be ascribed, they
must at least mention it in written form.
Other considerations coincide with the reasons for
reducing nearly any important agreement to written, legal
form.

One needs always to consider that the party w i t h whom

he dealt and enjoyed freedom from doubts may die.

His heirs,

w h o s e name alone may be sufficient for strong competition,
may be less scrupulous and imy have no intention to be bound
b y the terms of the decedent's unrecorded promises.
Inclusion of a covenant not to compete in the contrac—
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tuai a g r e em e n t s m a y force the contracting parties to a more
t h o r o u g h understanding, a h a t t e r mee t i n g of the minds ahout
fu t u r e competition.

If the seller is sincere ahout refrain

ing from competition, he should he w i l l i n g to sign a legal
i nstrument w h i c h defines a n d details s u c h abstinence.
w i l l i n g n e s s to do so, or lacic thereof,

is significant.

His
Fur

ther, c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the matter in detail m a y avoid un\7arr a n t e d l i t i g a t i o n a f t e r the signing,

including some u n f o r e 

s e e n tax consequences w h i c h will he d e t a i l e d in the n e x t two
chapters.

So that the parties m a y Imow, before and after,

that to w h i c h they have agreed, and so that others m a y also
he p r o p e r l y informed,

the m a t t e r must he discussed a n d r e duced

to w r i t t e n form*
T h e cmnner of p a y m e n t places a heavier h u r d e n o n one
or the other of the parties to he v e r y clear ahout the cove
n a n t ’s terms.

In a c a s h transaction, Tmyer must give u p the

e ntire c o n s i d e r a t i o n in a d v a n c e of s e l l e r ’s d e m o nstratio n
that h e will h o n o r his a g r e e m e n t not to compete.
t h o r o u g h l y the parties di s c u s s the transaction,

The more
the more will

huyer h a v e the o p p o r t u n i t y to gauge s e l l e r ’s intentions o n
each p o i n t and o n the w h o l e matter.

Further,

seller is simi

l arly g i v en a chance to obse r v e the b u y e r ’s behavior in this
a n d other areas, and thereby to k n o w better w i t h w h a t ki n d of
m a n h e is dealing.
Â sale w h i c h embodies defe r r e d payme n t s m a y require
e v e n m o r e care in a s s u r i n g mutual u n d e r s t a n d i n g because of
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the futurity factor.

The huyer may he inclined to cease mak

ing payments if he believes that seller is acting in violation
of the agreement as he (buyer) understands it.

On the other

hand, buyer may find seller more quickly on the verge of com
peting should the seller become anxious about the manner in
w h i c h the new owner is operating and thereby affecting his
(lxiyer*s) ability to complete the payment schedule.

This time

element creates strong anxieties for both parties, and a thor
ough pre-sale understanding is a helpful preventive for such
tensions.

Again, a detaibd covenant with prescribed penalties

forces more questions to be resolved before the sale.
Summary and Conclusions About Protection
On first probe, a covenant not to ctmipete may appear
to be little more than a legal latch on the door.

There is

the difficulty of constructing a valid agreement, and then,
should violations occur, of enforcing it— with possibly little
hope of full compensation in a long-range practical sense.
However, reasonableness of the covenant's terms can be estab
lished within conservative limits, and, if buyer bargains in
terms of minimum time and provable trade area, he can be rea
sonably certain of his legal protection.
Although the buyer may appear to be the favored party
in considerations about the covenant, it should be kept in
mind that this agreement well may be the implement which en-
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al)les seller to market his goodwill.

In any given case where

seller c o mpetition could he detrimental,

the sale proceeds

w o u l d p r o h a h l y he less without the inclusion of a protective
covenant•
In summation,

therefore,

p r o b l e m statement is activated.

the initial p o r t i o n of the
A properly conceived and

d r a f t e d covenant n o t to compete does achieve greater certain
ty of eliminating future competition hy the seller, and it
a ccomp l i s hes this in two respects.

First, w i t h i n the limita

tions of reasonahlenesa in its restrictions,

the covenant p r o 

vides a n enforceahle legal harrier against seller competition.
Secondly, and in the practical sense more importantly, a cove
nant w r o u g h t from a r m ’s length bargaining actualizes its pro
t e c t i o n hy:

(1) requiring the parties to entertain considera

tions about future c o m p e tition more thoroughly w h i l e they are
at the bargaining table;

(2) helping to make the parties more

a w a r e of the restrictions on competition and the consequences
for violations;

(3) causing e a c h party to reveal himself more

fully to the other in his concepts and intentions regarding
future competition;

and (4) bringing the parties into a more

complete under s t a n d i n g and meeting of the minds than would
h a v e occurred otherwise.

W i t h o u t a covenant,

it is extremely

doubtful tliat any of these conditions would exist to the ex
tent that its existence effectively insures.
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CHA.PTEH III
TAX CONSEQUENCES OVEKVIEi?
IN G O IE TAX TREAT..iENT
Without Covenant
W h e n a going twsiness is sold, the assets included
must he classified in three different categories in order
to determine the proper designation of the gain or loss on
each particular asset:

(1) capital assets;

(2) real prop

erty and depreciable property used in the trade or business
and held for more tlian six months; and <3) all other prop
erty*

A lthough a detailed explaimtion of the accounting

methods employed in the taxation of each of these categories
is beyond the scope or needs of this study, some elaboration
about them is necessary*

Initially, the basis of gain and

its proper designation for each will be outlined, assuming
a sale effected without a covenant not to compete*

Follow

ing tils, the same kinds of infornîation will be presented
relevant to the covenant*
Taking the assets in reverse order to the categories
indicated in the preceding paragraph,

Uie items properly

includible in the "all other" group would be such as stock—
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in-Crade, inventory, or property used in the business and held for six
months or less.

Cost is the basis for calculating gain on items in this

category, less accvuaulated depreciation (if any), and the gain which
results from the sale would be considered as an ordinary gain.
The assets in category two, real property and depreciable prop
erty used in the trade or business and held for more tlian six months,
come under Section 1231 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,^

Again,

cost is the usual basis for such property, although other bases may be
applicable, with an adjustment made for depreciation.

If the adjusted

basis is a result of straight-line depreciation, amortization, or de
pletion taken, then gain to the extent of such adjustment will be con
sidered ordinary and placed in category three,

luat which exceeds re

covery of previously-deducted amounts will be placed In category one as
a capital gain.

Essentially, items in category two are sucn as build

ings, machinery, furniture, fixtures, laim, lease-holds, patents, and
copyrights— all of which have been held for more than tiie six montas'
period.
Other than that portion of items incluued iu category two

^Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (St. Taul, hinn.; West Puolisuing
Co., 1954). pp. 373-370.
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TThlch is properly allocated to category one, capital assets,
the major component of capital assets in the sale of a going
"business is goodwill.

As indicated in Section 1221 of the

Code,^ goodwill is a n intangible capital asset of a taisiness
w h i c h is not subject to depreciation or maortization.
is included in a resale,
vious cost*

If it

its basis will ordinarily be its pre

In the absence of this, however, there is no one

method w hich is exclusively correct in establishing its al
ternative basis, the fair market value*
Without being so presumptuous as to suggest a sole,
proper approach to calculating the fair market value of good
will, Ixit with the latent knowledge of having examined many
tax court cases, this study will suggest one method apparent
ly acceptable to the Internal Revenue Service*

A normal re

turn from the investment in tangible assets for the particu
lar kind of enterprise is obtained through examining germane
key ratios procurable from Dun and Bradstreet*

The current

three to five years* return from the business in question is
then compared to the noriml return.

If a positive difference

results in favor of the subject business, this is capitalized
at the prevailing rate of interest.

Following this approach,

the ability of the firm to realize earnings above a normal re
turn from the investment in its tangible assets will have been
demonstrated in a manner previously accepted by the Internal
2lbid., p. 372.
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R e v e i m e Service.
O n c e the proper has is lias heen determined for each of
the assets,

the selling price mnst he allocated among all of

them o n the ratio that each hears to the total of the hases.
It is in this manner that gain (or loss)
m ined for each component.

Essentially,

is properly deter
therefore,

the proper

a l l o c a t i o n and de s i g n a t i o n of a sale without a covenant is a
f u n ction of proper hases, previous deductions ta&en,
held, a n d sale price.

In the aggregate,

time

that w h i c h is recov

ery of investment a n d o r d i n a r y g a i n to the seller estahlishes
h u y e r *s hase for resale and, in the appropriate areas, deprec
iation (or amortization or depletion).

In the case of long

term capital gain to the seller, one-half is excludihle from
taxable income and the balance is taxed at a rate not to ex
ceed twenty— five per cent on the total gain, basically.

No

future deductions m a y he taken through depreciation, amorti
zation, o r d e p l e t i o n o n this portion h y the huyer;

it simply

creates his hase for possible resale.
A l t h o u g h the preceding has h e e n a considerable u n d e r 
statement of the intricacies involved in such affairs,

the

fact remains that there are definite, established, approved
methods for accomplishing the end objective— alloca t i o n and
d e s i g n a t i o n for federal income tax purposes.

The procedures

a r e liard to understand— matters for expertise— hut there are
k n o w a b l e approaches, and the degree of risk in erring is low
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w h e n the proper technicians Imndle the matter.
Treatment of Covenant
Ko organisation such as Dun and Bradstreet exists to
aid in the proper valuation of a covenant not to compete, and
its designation is not definable in terms of cost, deprecia
tion, and time.

The Internal Devenue Service, in its hoohlet

entitled Tax Guide For Small Euslness « furnishes criteria for
the c o v enant’s proper designation (none for valuation) as fol
lows:^
Where a portion of the purclmse price is for a
covenant not to com-Deto, and the covenant is for a
f ixed number of y e a r s , the amount paid for the cove—
no.nt is deductible as a business expense proportion
ately over the life of the covenant*
If no portion
of the purchase price represents an amount paid for
a covenant not to compete, Init the contract of pur
chase rs'iuires you (purcliaser) to maîce periodic pay
ments in return for such a covenant, you may deduct
such payments as a business expense.
To do this you
Eïust be able to establish that the amount you paid
was for a covenant not to compete and was not, in
effect, the purchase of goodwill.
If a covenant not to compete accompanies the
transfer of goodwill and it has the function of
assuring you (ptircliaser) the beneficial enjoynont
of the goodwill you acquire, the covenant becomes
nonseverable o.nd its cost is considered a capital
asset which, like goodwill, is not subject to de
preciation or amortization.
As the preceding advices imply, there is a divergence
of effects on the contracting parties*

tax designations,, A

^ü.S,, Treasury Department, loo, c i t ,
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good illustration of this may he found in Benjamin Levinson
and Florence LeTlnson. et al t* Cotmnissioner of Internal
Revenue^ in I9 6 6 .

In this case, the court noted that the

Commissioner had assumed a neutral stand "• • • recognizing
tliat if w e find that the payments were for a covenant not
to compete, they are deductible hy the "buyers and taxable as
ordinary income to the sellers, or, if we find that the pay
ments were for goodwill, they are not deductible by the buy
ers but are taxable as capital gain to the seller,"
The following hypothetical example illustrates the
difference in tax impact or burden in a very simplified
situation.

The assumptions are that these are individual

(non— corporate) taxpayers who are married and filing joint
returns, that each has net taxable income exclusive of the
covenant amounting to $12,000, and tJmt A has sold a going
business to B in a transaction which calls for B to pay A
$3,000 per year for A's covenant not to compete.

This cove

nant was valued by the parties with the mutual understanding
and belief that it would be designated in its payments as
ordinary income to A and, therefore, be deductible by the
buyer, B,

With their net taxable incomes exclusive of the

covenant payment, each principal would have a marginal tax
rate of 25^ on the next $4,000 of taxable income which he
receives.

If the tax situation were to stand as contem—

^B, Levinson, et a l . 45 T.C, 380 (I9 6 6 ),
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plated Toy the parties, therefore, B*s situation would he un
changed as all of the $3,000 required to make the annual pay
ment would he deductible from net income before taxes.

For A,

25^ of the $3>000, or $7 5 0 , would accrue to taxes, and he would
realize $ 2,250 net each year— all other things being equal.
Should this designation be declared improper, how e v e r , say
the covenant is deemed to be given for the beneficial enjoyment
of the goodwill that B purchased (and thereby Inseparable from
goodwill), the tax picture changes considerably.

In order to

have $3*000 net income after taxes w i t h which to make the pay
ment, B would have to earn $4,000 before taxes, net.

Of the

$3,000 payment received by A, one-half, or $1,500 would be excludible as a long term capital gain.

The tax on the remain

ing $ 1,500 at 25$ would be $375* thus leaving A with a net
payment of $ 2 ,6 2 5 , a n increase of $375 from the previous sit
uation.

However,

the federal government is the real gainer

in such cases as it now receives a total of $ 1 ,3 7 5 * where its
previous income was the $750 tax paid by A.
The difference in the parties* marginal tax rates can
make the disparity wider or narrower, depending upon the change
in designation.

In the case of corporations, higher taxes can

result in the capital asset designation of the covenanlte pro
ceeds since corporations do not enjoy the one—half exclusion
on long term capital g a i n s .
Regardless of tiie aritlimetic involved in a changed
designation, and h o w much additional taxes the government may
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gain, the fact remains that the parties envisioned a differ
ent structure in their bargaining, and the change results in
a distortion of the agreement.

Had seller known that he would

enjoy capital gains tax treatment on the proceeds, instead of
ordinary income, he would likely have heen willing to accept
a lower sum.

On the other hand, had the huyer known that his

payments would have to come from after— taxes dollars, he well
may have heen unwilling to pay as much.
Ho w m u c h of a disconcerting effect this changeling
situation may have depends upon the certainty which the part
ies have in effecting one designation or another.

T h i s , of

course, is a function of heing ahle to follow the criteria
laid d o w n hy the designating entity.

The criteria will he

closely examined for reliability and precision in Chapter IV,
hut it is necessary to trace the steps in the processes of
allocation and designation first to enable one to identify
the allocators and designators in order of authority.
Initially, the parties to the contract of purchase
and sale discuss the value of each component in their nego
tiations,

Presumably, each is concurrently mentally desig

nating each item in terms of his own tax structure in order
to determine how many net dollars will he required to pay
for the firm (buyer's conteo^lations as to the deductibility
of his payments, wholly or partially), and how much of the
proceeds will he realized after taxes (seller's approach).
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Next, if a contract is effected, the allocations may
he inserted into the instrument, in fact or implicitly.

In

some few cases examined, the income tax designation nay also
he specifically mentioned, as it was contemplated hy the
parties to the agreement, as in Beniamin Levinson, et a l ,
sunra, note 4, this chapter.
Following the execution of the contract, each party
must make hoth an allocation and a designation of the pro
ceeds in his income tax return.

The Internal Revenue Service

then screens tie return, and, if it agrees with taxpayer’s con
clusions, the matter essentially ends at that point.

However,

if a discrepancy is noted, the taxpayer will he notified to
that effect with a statement of the amount of deficiency (this
study is not concerned with overpayments).
must pay the deficient sum.

The taxpayer then

If he refuses to pay, the Com

missioner of Internal Revenue will instigate criminal action
against him.

On the other hand, if he pays and wishes to dis

pute the matter, a hearing w i t h the Cozmnissloner is requested.
If the taxpayer is still dissastM'ied after such a hearing,
h e then may instigate legal action against the Commissioner,
Thus, in the case of Commissioner against the taxpayer, or
taxpayer against Coimaissiœier, the ultimate allocator and
designator is the tax court.

It is the tax court’s criteria

for allocation and designation which must he followed to avoid
uncertainty in the tax treatment.

The question is:

criteria he followed?
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CHAPTER IT
COVENANT TAX DESIGNATION AND ALLOCATION
ELEMENTS OF UNCERTAINTY
Contradictions in the Courts
In determining the validity and enforceahility of the
covenant from the protection standpoint, the courts rely upon
the criterion of reasonableness consonant with the public in
terest.

As indicated in Chapter II, concepts of time and geo

graphic area in support of reasonableness can be definitely
expressed in conservative terms.

It was concluded that a high

degree of protective certainty could be assured by adhering to
the previously court-approved restraints of three years in
time and the provable trade area.

Are there any such readily

discernible concepts which support the designative and alloca
tive criteria of the tax courts?
First, one needs to look at the general criteria used
by these courts in designating the covenant not to compete.
In its 1965 Standard Federal Tax Reports,^ Commerce Clearing
House sets forth two broad criteria which are essentially the

^665 CCH STAND. FED. TAX REP., Par. k?l7*0977*
31
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same as the guidelines indicated hy the courts in that portion
of each case where the opinion is introduced*
1) Where an agreement not to compete accompanies
the transfer of goodwill in the sale of a going husi—
ness and it is apparent that the covenant not to com
pete has the function primarily of assuring to the
purchaser the beneficial enjoyment of the goodwill he
has acquired, the agreement is regarded as nonseverable and as being in effect a contri tu ting element to
the assets transferred, and hence gain therefrom is
treated entirely as a capital gain.
2) Where the covenant not to compete is dealt
with as a separate item in the sale of a business,
payment received for the covenant is ordinary income.
To illustrate the application of these criteria in the
courts. Commerce Clearing House cites fourteen exemplary cases
for the first category, and seventeen such cases for the sec
ond.

Most of these imtters are of recent (current ten years)

adjudication, but some older cases are cited to show develop
ment over time.

In an attempt to determine if any basic con

cepts from these cases had been used with a high degree of
consistency, or certainty, in supporting either of the desig
native criteria, all of them were analyzed in detail.

Thir

teen additional cases, all recent and pertaining to the same
matter, were also examined.
The criteria for designating the tax status of the
covenant are generally well-known and established in the tax
courts, but in the form indicated by Commerce Clearing House,
One other highly pervasive guideline should be added*

"All

of the facts and circumstances of each case must be considered,"
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Using these forms of criteria, the tax courts have the consid
erable task of determining when and under what conditions a
covenant is given "primarily" to assure the purchaser of the
"beneficial enjoyment of the goodwill he has acquired," and
what constitutes dealing with the covenant as a "separate item
in the sale of a business,"
From the forty-four legal battles analyzed, ten basic
concepts have been selected for illustration.

These concepts

are of a type which might reasonably be expected to transcend
the boundaries of any case or set of cases, as will be appar
ent,

The matter of certainty in the tax designation of the

covenant not to compete will also become obvious as these
cases arc

’

One of the concepts advanced throughout the cases is
that a n allocation of a portion of the purchase price to the
covenant not to compete constitutes evidence that the parties
dealt w i t h the covenant as a separate item.

Consequently, in

Ernest E, Suggs, supra, note 3, Chapter I, when $50,250 of
the total of $72,000 paid for the Suggs*

insurance business

was allocated in the contract to the covenant, it was desig
nated by the court as ordinary income.

The court stated,

"The value agreed upon as evidenced by the executed contract
is all we have to measure , , * •"

However, in Joseph Faulk

ner and Marjorie FaulTmer v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.^

^J, Faulkner, 15 CCH Tax Ct, Mem, 1?5 (1956).
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'wi'th. $10,000 of ’tlie tot&l price of $29»250 ascril)ed in the
contract for tiie restrictive covenant, the court said that
"* • . allocations within a contract do not make the proceeds
ordinary income,” and designated the entire sum as from the
sale of a capital asset.
Conversely, where no allocation is made Id the cove
nant in the contract, the admission has heen in support of
the nonseverahi 1 i ty of the covenant and treatment of the
proceeds as a capital asset.

Therefore, in Edward A. Eennev

and Estate of Helen V. Kenney, Deceased, etal v. Coiaaiissioner
of Internal Revenue.^ where no part of a $35,000 purchase
price was allocated to the covenant, the court noted that
"neither party placed any independent value on the covenant
not to compete, and we can ascribe none to it,"

In another

case wherein there was no allocation to the covenant, however,
Williamson & Vi'ai te. Inc. v. United States of America,^ it was
observed by the court that while the contract did not specify
any portion of the total consideration of $25,000 as applic
able to the covenant, such was the "dominant and controlling
asset" timt $18,?50 was allocated to it and designated as
ordinary income.
Another concept often advanced to negate any value of
a covenant not to compete ic the inability of the covenantor

3 e .A, IConney. 37 T.C, 1161 (Acq,) (1962).
^Yilliamson & Waite. Inc.. Cdl 62-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
Far. 9163 (l96i).
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to compete*

This was considered relevant and admissible in

George J* Aitïceii and Elizabeth M. Aitken v* Commissioner of
tf
Internal R e v e n u e .-^ where the court found that the covenant
liad no worth, stating, "Because of his ill health at the time
of entry into this contract, petitioner would not liave heen
physically ahle to compete with (huyer)*"

A little over three

years later, the court was unimpressed w i t h this concept and,
in Charles \V* Ealthroioe a.ml Mary W* Ealthrone v. Commissioner
of Internal Bevenue*^ it stated that, "In this ce se, the ill
health of seller only established an urgency to the sale."
The allocation to the covenant vm,B upheld as ordinary income*
The point at which the covenant enters the negotia
tions, relative to the time when the purcîiaee price is set,
is a concept often noted*

In James G* Thompson v* Comais-

6 ioner of Internal Revenue,^ the total purciiaee price was
agreed upon before the parties discussed the covenant not
to compete.

Disallowing any allocation to the covenant, the

court declared, "Coming as it did after the price liad heen
fixed, it (the covenant*s allocation) can iiardly he taken
as heing part of the bargained-for consideration."

Such con

ceptual logic was unimportant to the court in the matter of

5c.J. A i t k e n . 35 T.C. 22? (i960).
^C.W. Balthrone. 23 CCH Tax Ct. Hem* 1^6 H 9 6 k ) ,
^J.G. Thompson. 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem* 1196 (1964)*
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Anthony Roclr. v. Commissioner of Internal Reyemie»^

Rocîc ar

rived at an agreed price of $108,000 for his minority stock
interest in a dairy.

ïîien, on the day of the contract’s

execution, two agreements were presented— one for $63,000
for stock and another of $4^,000 for a separate covenant.
The allocation to the covenant ivas upheld.
In Bertha Schwartz: and Harry Schrartz v. Commissioner
of Internal R e v e n u e an allocation of $110,000 of the total
price of $725,000 paid petitioners for their markets— speci
fied in the contract as for the covenant not to compete— was
disallowed for heing "unrealistic."

However, petitioner’s

plea in Beniamin Levinson, sunra. note 4, Chapter III, that
$142,000 of the $147,000 purchase price received hy him was
unrealistioally allocated to the covenant was rejected.

The

court noted that it realized that a more realistic allocation
might have heen made and that the allocation included in the
subject contract was made at the insistence of purchasers
acutely aware of the tax consequences, hut it rejected unrealism as in impinging concept.
Whether the installment payments for a covenant not
to compete cease upon actual competition has heen a concept
for testing the agreement’s authenticity.

In Eramette L. Bar—

^A. R o c k . 21 GCE Tax Ct. Mem. 46 (1962).
°B. Schwartz. 19 CCH Tax Ct, Mem. 1276 (i9 60 ).
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r a n * supra^ note 9, Cliapter II, the covenant’s allocation
gained in credlhility as a separate item because its pay
ments were to stop if sellers competed,

Hcnever, the con

tractual agreement that payments for the covenant were to
continue, even after seller’s death, in Benjamin Levinson.
supra, note

Chapter III, did not even gain admission as

a concept in devaluing the covenant.

Dismissing it from

consideration, the court observed that

, the payments

to other persons of any remaining installments in the event
of (petitioner’s) death prior to (completion of the contract)
we think, are immaterial,"
The courts appear to alternate in admitting the con
cept of whether the parties had knowledge of the tax conse
quences of the agreement into which they entered.

Thus, in

E. E. Suggs, supra, note 3, Cliapter I, the court stated tliat
"It may well be that the sellers did not know . . . the tax
consequences of the allocations in (paragraph containing the
covenant), but that is iuimaterial as long as the contract was
otherwise fully understood by the parties."

Greater sympatliy

was offered by the court, although the allocation was not
changed, in John W, Eogere and Greta B. Bogers v. United States
of America^^ when it was allowed that "Had there been any equi
vocation or any confusion as to what was done (allocation to
the covenant designated as ordinary income to sellers), then
lOj.W. Rogers. (GA-9), CGII 61-1 U.S. Tax Gas, Par, 9^7^»
290 F, 2d 501 (1961).
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taxpayers would have had a far different case."
In William D. Allison and Sara L. Allison v. Congnis—
sioner of Internal Revenne^^ the concept that purchaser would
not have "bought without a protective covenant was admitted as
consideration in support of the covenant’s heing primarily to
assure purchaser the benefit of the goodwill which he had
bought, hence nons ever able from goodwill.

The same concept

in Benjamin Levinson, supra, note 4, Chapter III, and E. E.
Suggs, supra. note 3» Cliapter I, was admitted as contributing
to the opposite contention— that the covenant had been dealt
with as a separate item.
When the agreement for sale and the covenant not to
compete are contained in a single contract, the court might
deem this as contributing evidence that the covenant is no
more than protection of goodwill and, therefore, a capital
asset.

Such was the conclusion in Joseph FaulTcner. aipra.

note 2, this chapter.

On the other hand, this type of con

tract may be acceptable in a matter similar to Ben Lichtman
and Ruth Lichtraan. et al v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue^^
where $35,000 of a $40,000 purchase price was held to be for
the covenant, severable from goodwill.
Finally, in the matter of Sidney Alper and Sydelle

^^W.D. Allison. 23 CCH Tax Ct, Mem, 199 (1964),
Lichtman. 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1?45 (1964).
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Alper T* Conæai S3 loner of Internal ReTenue^3 the covenant’s
separated allocation of $42,335 of the total proceeds of
$ 3 5 f000 was adjudged nons everahie from the goodwill purchased
because the court saw it not as personal in nature, hut simply
as a means for the buyers to decrease possible future competi
tion and thereby protect goodwill*

This concept was applied

oppositely in Emmet te L« Bar r a n , supra. note 9> Cliapter I,
where one of the reasons advanced for designating the covenant
as a severable item was that the buyers might have been will
ing to effect such an agreement with anyone, without buying
his business and goodwill, as a means of decreasing possible
future competition*

In one case decreasing competition contri

buted to evidence that the covenant was nonseverable from good
will, yet in another case the same concept was accepted in
support of the opposite proposition*
The point of these examples, and there are many more,
is that finding concepts which are certain to support one de
sired designation is difficult to say the least when one is
dealing with the designative criteria of the coveimnt not to
compete*

In all of these ejiamples, the same concept accrued

to either designation*

Thus, a taxpayer inay not talce a con

cept, or a bimdle of them, from cases already decided and
thereby assure himself of a similar outcome— even though his

Alper. 15 CCH Tax Ct* Mem. l4l5 (1956).
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concepts may seem to parallel those in other cases.

The sum

of the concepts is not a guarantee of a desired designation
hecause each cas^s total context— -its collective facts and
circumstances—-will hear upon the alignment of each concept,
and each case will differ from its predecessors and successors.
Although the allocation and desigjiation may change,
the covenant’s protective features are not altered hy such
changes in its taxation.

Once validated, or not invalidated,

the protection remains even though the consideration paid for
it may he drastically altered in after-taxes dollars.
For all of the other components to the sale, some kind
of reliable approach is available to secure a high degree of
certainty in the tax treatment.

No precise means of valuing

or designating tlie covenant exists at this time, however, as
the preceding cases indicate,

Periiaps it was after a study

of such cases that the National Association of Insurance Agents*
general legal counsel, George S, ilanson, ^vas prompted to write,
"The tax consequences of the purchase and sale of an insurance
agency cannot he stated in a categorical way"— almost every
sale of an insurance agency contains an agreement with a covenantiot to compete.

lU

Aside from the designative and allocative uncertain
ties which result even with expert legal handling of a cove-

^^George S, Hanson, "Recent Tax Decisions on Purchase
and Sale of Agencies," The American Agency Bulletin. (May,
1961), distributed reprint.
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nant, other elements of imcertaintjr are inevitable.
Miscellaneous Covenant Tax Pitfalls
The entrapments which contribute to tax uncertainties
in this area can he divided into tno hroad types:

(1) tech

nicalities of the law, and (2) taxpayer-initiated difficulties.
In the former category, a cure could he legal expertise, hut
even with a higîily-skilled tax attorney, oversights can occur.
The second division will not diminish until the hasic human
personality is altered— as the cases used to illustrate it will
show.

Both of these areas represent elements of uncertainty

wliich are hound to re-occur, and the inclusion of a covenant
not to compete in the agreement for sale is the catalyst.
One of the legal pitfalls which sellers might encount
er is best exemplified hy the case of Anthony Rock, supra, note
8, this chapter.

In this matter, Bock sold his stock interest

in a dairy and designated part of the proceeds for the stock
and part for a covenant not to compete— in the contract,

Vfhen

he filed his tax return, Rock treated the entire sum as pro
ceeds from the sale of a capital asset and the Internal Reve
nue Service disagreed.

In the ensuing legal hattle, Rock based

part of his argument on the contention that the covenant had
heen given to insure the purchaser the beneficial enjoyment of
the goodwill transferred and was, therefore, nonseverable from
that goodwill.

The argument lost all weight, however, when
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the court noted that stock had heen sold— evidence of owner
ship of a huslness, not the business itself.

Since stock

holders liave no direct proprietary interest in goodwill, the
covenant Ixad to he severable.

Therefore, if stock is heing

sold, taxpayers may not rely on the contention tliat an accom
panying covenant is to insure the purchaser the beneficial
enjoyment of goodwill heing transferred since no goodwill is
heing transferred.

This same factor applied to Charles W.

Balthrone, supra, note 6, this chapter, and to Pickering and
Coigpanv. Inc. v, Goimnissioner of Internal Bevenue.
In jSelson Weaver Peal ty Company and Nelson «leaver
Mortgage Company. Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
Nelson Weaver Mortgage Company, Inc., sold its mortgage
servicing contract with the New York Life Insurance Company
to a third party.

Nelson Weaver Realty Company, which had

written policies of dwelling insurance on the mortgaged prop
erties, thought tliat it was also selling those policies* ex
pirations to that same third iiarty.

Realty Company accom

panied the sale with an agreement not to solicit nor write
the renewal policies on any of the dwellings whose mortgages
were heing transferred for servicing.

Because the mortgage

records contained all of the inforination necessary to renew
the insurance policies, in many cases containing the original

^^Pickorin/r & Co.. Inc.. 23 CCH Tax Ct, Mem, 466 (1964),
^% e l s o n leaver Realty Co.. (CA-5)t CCh 62-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. Par. 9719 (1962).
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policies, Realty Company saw no reason to furnish any of its
insurance agency records to the purchaser.

This ivas one of

their do^mfalls in the case hecause the court held that the
ahsence of tangible records of insurance heing transferred
made it evident that expirations had not heen sold.

Thus,

no capital assets in the nature of goodwill— from an insur
ance stnadpoint, the expiration records— were involved, and
the covenant not to compete was the real benefit which the
court saw being transferred as a separate item.

This changed

the tax designation of $3,000 of the proceeds to Kelson Weaver
Realty Company from capital gain to ordinary income.
The second major category of miscellaneous pitfalls
is taxpayer-initiated difficulties.

Taxpayers often appear

to he their own worst enemies in cases involving the covenant
not to compete.

Perliaps persons with the business acumen and

personality complex capable of building a going concern which
is salable have the fallibilities of special1SKitlon and ex
treme independence;

Regardless of whether the problems are

personality-derived, however, the following three cases will
serve to illustrate this further area of uncertainty in the
instance of the covenant not to compete.
In the matter of Thomas K. Yam'ell and Dorothy d,
Yandell v. United States of America, M r ,

Yandell sold his

Yandell. (GA-9), CCH 63-1 U.S. Tax Gas, far,
9366, 315 F, (2D)
(1963).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

44
partnership interest in an acconnting firm through a contract
which stated tliat the total consideration was heing paid to
him for his covenant not to compete.

As Mr. Yandell was an

accountant, ho felt no need to engage a tax attorney to as
sist liin.

He was certain liy all rules of the ledger tliat he

was selling fundamental goodwill no matter what the contract
called it.

The court was not as cognizant of good accounting

practices as Yandell, however, and it held that his testimony
in direct conflict idth the provisions of a written instrument
freely signed hy him ivas of little weight.

Therefore, his en

tire proceeds were designated as ordinary income, despite Yan
dell* s firm conviction that the whole matter was simply an
error in terminology.
Mr. Ernest Suggs, in the case of S. E. Suggs, supra,
note 3, Cliapter I, engaged and consulted with an attorney,
hut liiB lawyer was not a tax specialist.
contract for the sale of M s

When Suggs took the

insurance agency, in its final

pre-signing form with $50»250 of the total price of $72,000
allocated to a covenant not to compete, to his counsel the
latter advised some minor cMn g e s , hut completely overlooked
the covenant’s sigMficanoe.

This moved the court to note

tliat, "It may well he that the sellers either did not Imow
or entirely overlooked the tax consequences of the allocations
in Paragraph 11 (the covenant), hut that is immaterial as long
as the contract was otherwise fully understood hy the parties.”
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The court then designated the $50,250 tliat the Suggs had con
templated as capital gain to he ordinary income.
Perhaps the party for whom one is least inclined to
feel sycqmtliy in these matters is he who engages competent
tax counsel, lawyer and accountant, and then disregards their
advices.

In the case of Benjamin Lichtman. supra. note 12,

this chapter, the court also held little pity for petitioner
when it designated $35,000 of the $40,000 proceeds from the
sale of his laundry as ordinary income instead of capital
gain.

It was noted that the covenant’s allocation of $35,000

had heen separately bargained for, valued, and agreed to by
parties advised by competent tax counsel,

Lichtman apparent

ly was certain that the covenant would be nonseverable from
goodwill and did not heed ezpert advices that it possibly
could be severed,
No One Factor a Sole Determinant
It should be stressed that many other factors en
tered into the decision in all of these cases.

Although

some concepts indicated may have had an apparently strong
bearing on the outcome, in no case examined was aiy single
item indexed as the entire basis of the promulgation.

It

is this matter of having to consider the total context of
each case in order to accept, reject, weight, and align
its concepts that makes each matter unique.

Because of this

singular nature, the cliangeling aspects of the covenant not
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to compete*s tas d e B i g m t i v e criteria make it an item of
high risk— rmcertainty— from a tas staixlpoint,
Furtlier, where the other components are definable in
mathematical terms, the covenant not to compete is a purely
rhetorical item*

It is defined in words, not accounting pro

cedures, and it can he attacked rhetorically.

Once given a

legitimate hirtli, however, it can then he dealt with in ac
counting terms.
Of course, there is a way to avoid the tax uncertain
ties introduced hy the covenant not to compete— do not include
one.

Excluding tlie covenant, however, also excludes its pro

tective qualities and its ability to assist in the m r k e t i n g
of goodwill.
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CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Protection Certainty Greater Due To Covenant
A covenant not to compete constitutes a contractual
obligation of the seller.

If reasonable In Its terms, the

covenant Is legally valid and Its protective qualities for
the buyer are achieved with a high degree of certainty.

If

unreasonable, however, the protection will be no less than
that afforded in the absence of such an agreement.

Further,

a val Id covenant Is enforceable at law, and violations of
Its restrictions entitle the injured party to seek relief enc/
or damages through the courts.
One possible detraction of some Import Is obvious to
those who delve Into this nmtter to any extent, and it should
be asserted at this point.

Since there Is no way to be ab

solutely certain of the protective features of a covenant, a
measure of this consideration should be Injected Into every
such bargaining series,

A buyer could find himself in far

worse circumstances if he believed a covenant ivas effective,
bargained In price terms commensurately, and executed a con47
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■tract with a euhsequently-deemed imenforceahle covenant, than
If he had dealt originally without a covenant.

In such a

situation, the purchase price would he higher due to belief
in the covenant’s validity than it would have been in the
absence of any contemplation of a covenant*

Thus, at least

a portion of the price paid would have gone for a non-exist
ent asset— an unenforceable covenant.

When no covenant is

included in a sale of a going business, the buyer can assume
a defensive price posture.

In these cases, it is better not

to have Txtrgained at all than to have bargained and lost.
As Chapter II indicated, however, the protective
certainty afforded by a covenant with parameters of minimum
reasonable time and provable geographic area is greater tlmn
would exist in the case of no covenant.

A high certainty

of protection in such matters is a direct function of proper
legal advice sought and followed.

Further, price considera

tions should be in terms of minimums of time and space as the
maximums, i . e . - outer feasible limits of three years for
the time restriction and a definable, provable radius of past
business transactions as the trade area constraint.

In this

manner, a conservative approach will reduce the chance of
loss resulting from an invalidated covenant.

With these

qualifications, the first portion of the thesis* problem
statement was activated affirmatively.

To restate it, the

certainty of protection is greater with a covenant not to
compete.
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Tax Designation Certainty Diminished
As diapters III and IV indicated, the introduction
of a covenant is accompanied by elements of uncertainty in
designating the sale proceeds for federal income tax pur
poses.

A proper handling of the assets is a matter for

considerable expertise without the complications of a third
variable, the covenant not to compete.

Hot only is the valu

ation of a covenant a matter unique to each case, It is an
item whose allocation and designation in the contract may
have little or no bearing on the tax courts* findings.

No

appraisal experts or prior accounting functions are avail
able in the uncharted grounds of the covenant.
The cases in Chapter IV illustrated tiiat the desig
nation of the sale proceeds can be clianged, wholly or partial
ly, from capital gain to ordinary income whether any part of
the sale price was allocated to the covenant or not.

Simi

larly, with no established precedents to follow, any contrac
tual allocation or designation may be wholly embraced or re
jected by the courts.

Of course, cases can be found (to a

lesser extent) in which any of the assets* allocations and
designations were changed.

The point to be made for the cove

nant, however, is that it enlmnces the uncertainties of the
situation by constituting a more volatile variable which
adds to the number of uncertainty combinations.

It is, in a

sense, exponential where the others are arithmetic.
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case, the degree of risk or uncertainty in the sale proceeds*
tax designation is greater with a covenant than without it.
To illustrate this point, the cases chosen for Chap
ter IT were of an exemplary nature in the area concerned.
They contained concepts of a basic nature, and it was demon
strated that the same concept could aid in the establishment
of either tax designation.

Even in cases where expert coun

sel had been employed, the matter was of such a controversial
nature tliat legal gamesmanship became necessary to resolve
many cases.

Because of the fundamental character of these

conflicts, and because of the continuing vague designative
criteria, it can readily be expected that any number of fu
ture tax court battles will have the same underlying struc
ture, conceptually.
Conclusions
On the basis of the evidence revealed and analyzed
by this study, the problem must be stated in the affirmative:
Yes, the covenant not compete does achieve greater certainty
of eliminating future competition from the seller at the
cost of diminishing certainty in the federal income tax des
ignation! s) of the purchase monies.

Other conclusions in the

nature of observations, advices, and comments are coincident
with the purposes of the study, however, and will fortlurith
be offered.
It is not within the province of this thesis, legally
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nor logically, to offer firm advice about the drafting of
contracts.

What will be given, in the interest of dissem

inating information and thoughts, are suggestions of some
approaches which the cases examined seem to indicate as
favorable.

In order to instill these implications with

the property of emanating from a valid sampling, the sole
frame of reference will be the thirty-one exemplary cases
from Commerce Clearing House.
Among the cases indicated, certain concepts were
conspicuous by their prevalence, or absence, from eitlier
designation.

Fourteen of the thirty-one cases were listed

under a heading which categorized their designation outcome
as capital asset, nonseverable from goodwill.

The remaining

seventeen cases comprised the separable, ordinary income
designation outcome.

Although it must lo noted again that

no single concept was found which constituted the court’s
sole determinant in promulgating a decision, some concepts
appear to be amenable to forming a base upon which to build
for a particular designation.
In nine of the fourteen cases which culminated in
the capital asset designation of the covenant, no part of
the purchase price was allocated to the covenant in the
contract of sale.

Further, in none of these cases was tie

covenant contained in a separate instrument.

Conversely,

all seventeen ordinary income cases had some part of the
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proceeds specifically allocated to the covenant, and nine of
these cases dealt with the covenant in a separate contract
with a separate price designation.

What is strongly evident

here is that the courts have accepted the concept of separatioiv as evidenced hy the draftsmanship of the contracts, in
support of the designative criterion for ordinary income,
"dealt with as a separate item,"

Alternatively, the absence

of such separation appears to accrue to the "nonseverable
from goodwill" standard.
Transfers of personal service husinesses seem to he
especially susceptible to uncertainty and ensuing litigation
over the covenant’s designation.

Of the thirty-one cases

in Commerce Clearing House, the highest incidence of suit—
five of the thirty-one cases— involves fire and casualty
insurance agency sales.

Second place on this dubious list

is accorded to accounting firms with four of the cases cited.
Drafting a covenant not to compete, both from the
protective and tax designative viewpoints, is a matter of
some degree of uncertainty and for technical expertise.
Professional tax counsels— tax attorneys and accountants—
are aware of this.

Persons who engage in study and research

in the particular realm of the covenant become cognisant of
its powers and tax consequences.

But professional business

men, who are the immediately Interested parties to many con
tracts containing the restrictive covenants and whose dollars
are at stake, all too often do not realize fully the cove-
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na.nt*s implications.

If their dollars and cents delibera

tions are to culminate in a meaningful, after-taxes meeting
of the minds, the advices of experts in the tax field are
needed from the beginning of negotiations.

As previously

mentioned, the purchase price is the essence of a contract
of sale, but the significant sum is that to be realized by
both parties after taxes.

Logically, any distortion of

that bargained-for sum must result in an alteration of the
original meeting of the minds.
As an example of the degree of careful draftsman
ship requisite to the designation of an allocation to the
covenant not to compete as ordinary income, some of the
courts* judgment criteria in addition to those previously
indicated ares

(1) the covenant must be bargained for as

a separate item in the total affair, not merely entered into
a separate contractj (2) the value assigned to the covenant
must have some independent Tmsis in fact and not be just a
tax device; (3) the price allocated to the other assets m e t
be realistic; (4) the contract Biust accurately reflect the
parties* agreement reached at arm’s length with respect to
the covenant; <5) the covenantor must have the capacity to
compete.
The parties should consider and agree to the covenant
not to compete*® allocation and designation so that they are
clear about their desires.
able assistance.

This process requires knowledge

Then the parties* desires must be entered
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Into a contract in such a form that the probability will be
high for any subsequent tax authority or court to find only
that which the parties intended.
lence of artisans is required.

Again, the drafting excel
In summation, the admonition

given to member-agents by the National Association of Insur
ance Agents* chief legal counsel, George Hanson, is highly
appropriate:
Some concepts of great value have been emerging
from recent tax decisions. The most fundamental
concept is that, whether the agent is buying or
selling, professional legal and tax advice is es
sential before the contract is entered into. Care
ful draftsmanship of the purchase and sale con
tract is essential. After the contract is signed,
it is too late to change the tax consequences.
A proper contract entered into by parties with ade
quate information on which to make their judgments is one
which will reduce the necessity for the courts to construe.
It is submitted that this will also elevate the probability
that the parties* wishes will succeed, based as they are on
expertise.
Final Observations
#uny of the cases examined culminated in ecanomic
heartbreak for one of the parties involved.

Although this

^George S. Hanson, "Recent Tax Decisions on Purchase
and Sale of Agencies," The American Agency Bulletin (May,
1961), distributed reprint.
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adversity was severe in many cases, coincident with it was
evidence that it was often a function of people trying to
arrive at proper judgments armed with inadequate or improper
information.

In some few cases, however, where the advised

careful draftsmanship and expert counsel was present, the
courts still found contrary to the contractually-stated al
locative and designative terms,

V.Tiile this study could of

fer little hope to those who dealt from positions of ignor
ance, it was going to propose a remedy for the well-conceived
cases' adverse outcomes which would establish near-ultimate
certainty for those prudent enough to seeîc and follow proper
ascriptions.
As a final observation, therefore, this study was
going to recommend that the courts and the Internal Revenue
Service concur on a rule which would force all parties to
follow the allocations and designations agreed to in the
contract for sale, excepting only otherwise illegal contracts.
Thus, those who would make themselves ar-are of this rule
could deal with great certainty about the tax treatment of
their sal© proceeds.

Before the study was concluded, however,

it was discovered that the Internal levenae Service had al
ready made such a recommendation to the courts in a 1?65 case,
Carl L, Danielson and Pauline L. Danielson, et a l . v. Com
missioner of Internal Revenue.2 where the court noted that;
Respondent vigorously urges us to adopt a new "rule"
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of law c o n c e m i n g the treatment of such written cove
nants,
The proposed "rule" would prevent either con
tracting party thereto or the respondent from subse
quently attacking the stated consideration in such
agreements unless fraud, duress, or undue influence
existed at the time they were signed
. . .
We are unwilling to abdicate our judicial respon
sibilities of examining the substance of a transaction.
We are not bound by its form. We are under no obliga
tion to restrict ourselves to the written documents
evidencing covenants not to compete, which, of course,
would prevent us from arriving at a decision based on
all the pertinent facts.
With this pronouncement, the court effectively emas
culated wîiat was to have been this study’s recoimnendation
for the resolution of the problem.

Perhaps the best advice

to be offered is to restrict oneself to dealings with men
of good will and sound loiowledge.

Further, one should be

ware of petty men in all dealings for no contract can be
written or adjudicated to afford protection from such as they.
After reading the works of iîalthus, Thomas Carlyle
was led to call economics the "dismal s c i e n c e . B a s e d upon
the fino,l outcomes of its research, this study would propose
tliat the attempt to inquire scientifically into the federal
income tax treatment of the covenant not to compete be deemed
the contemporary "disiaal science,"

York:

^Robert L, Heilbroner, The Worldly Philosophers (Kew
Simon and Schuster, Inc,, 1961), p, 61,
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